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Do Bookmakers Possess Superior Skills to Bettors in Predicting Outcomes?
Abstract
In this paper we test the hypothesis that bookmakers display superior skills to bettors in 
predicting the outcome of sporting events by using matched data from traditional 
bookmaking and person-to-person exchanges.  Employing a conditional logistic regression
model on horse racing data from the UK we find that, in high liquidity betting markets,
betting exchange odds have more predictive value than the corresponding bookmaker odds. 
To control for potential spillovers between the two markets, we repeat the analysis for cases 
where prices diverge significantly. Once again, exchange odds yield more valuable 
information concerning race outcomes than the bookmaker equivalents.
Keywords: betting exchanges; market efficiency; prediction.
JEL Classification: D82, G12, G14.
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1. Introduction
There have been many studies of the efficiency of horse race betting markets, based either on 
bettor determined prices (as in pari-mutuel markets) or bookmaker determined prices, the
latter mainly based on UK data (see, for example, Smith et al., 2006).  Most studies of 
bookmaker markets indirectly infer the superiority of bookmaker skills over bettor skills from 
the existence of persistent negative returns to bettors in aggregate.  However, if bettors 
receive consumption utility from placing wagers in addition to utility from monetary returns, 
bettor superiority may be consistent with aggregate negative returns.  Furthermore these 
studies tell us nothing about the abilities of bettors who choose to refrain from entering the 
market when they judge that bookmaker prices overstate the true chances of race entrants.
In this paper we use matched data from traditional bookmaking and person-to-person 
exchanges to test the hypothesis that bookmakers display skills superior to bettors in 
predicting the outcome of sporting events.  One might expect on the basis of the already 
extensive literature in the economics of auctions (e.g. Klemperer, 1999, 2004) that the 
decentralised nature of the decision-making processes characteristic of betting exchanges 
would accomplish the aggregation of dispersed information in a very efficient manner, 
whereas the bookmaker (however well informed) may fail to match as efficiently the 
information revealed through such decentralised bidding. The point here is that the 
decentralised market aggregates information in a way that no-one is able to do individually. 
Indeed, there is a growing body of literature which shows that decentralised exchange 
markets are very efficient in providing forecasts of the probability, the mean and median 
outcomes, and the correlations among a range of future events. Such markets have been used 
very successfully to predict uncertain outcomes ranging from the box office prospects of 
Hollywood movies, through vote shares in elections, to the sales of Hewlett-Packard printers 
(e.g. Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Snowberg et al., 2005; Gruca and Berg, 2007).
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 gives relevant background 
information relating to the betting markets analysed in our study. Section 3 describes the data 
drawn from bookmaker and betting exchange markets.  Section 4 outlines the methodology 
employed.  Our results are presented in Section 5, with discussion. Section 6 concludes.
2. Bookmakers and betting exchanges
A study by Levitt (2004) evaluates the relative assessments of bookmakers and bettors with 
reference to data from a handicapping competition based on US National Football League 
matches. Levitt characterises the difference between conventional financial asset markets 
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and betting markets as follows: in the former the complexity of information affecting the 
value of assets is such that market makers cannot gain an advantage through superior 
processing of information to the market as a whole. In contrast, Levitt claims, market makers 
in betting markets (bookmakers) possess skills in assessing the true chance of various 
outcomes superior to most bettors, and at least as good as the subset of most skilful bettors. 
He suggests that the structural consequences of this differential degree of sophistication are 
that spot markets equalising supply and demand prevail in conventional financial assets 
markets, with market makers earning the bid-ask spread, whereas profit maximising 
bookmakers set prices to exploit bettor biases, constrained only by the presence of the smaller 
number of unbiased bettors. Bookmakers therefore earn the equivalent of a bid-ask spread 
(known as over-round) and an additional return accruing from their exploitation of bettor 
biases. One consequence of this tendency of bookmakers to act as price makers is that 
individual books will expose them to positive risk, as bookmakers assume long and short 
positions exploiting bettor biases.
A disadvantage of the Levitt approach is that, for his data, bookmakers set the terms 
of the transaction, and bettors respond with a simple decision whether to bet or not. The most 
skilful players in this situation may be exercising their talents most effectively in cases where 
they leave specific games alone, but these decisions are not measured in the Levitt study. A 
more comprehensive test of the relative sophistication of bookmakers and bettors in assessing 
the true chances of a range of outcomes would permit bettors to express alternative prices to 
bookmakers so that we can observe the distribution of revealed preferences of both groups.
We are fortunate that this experiment can now be observed to occur spontaneously 
over many events in a set of parallel betting markets that has developed in the UK in recent 
years.  The first of these markets is the competitive array of bookmaker fixed odds for 
specific races available to bettors on the internet.  The second is to be found in the person-to-
person markets, or betting exchanges, which have revolutionised the betting industry in the 
UK in recent years (Jones et al., 2006).
Betting exchanges exist to match people who want to bet on a future outcome at a 
given price with others who are willing to offer that price.  The person who bets on the event 
happening at a given price is the backer.  The person who offers the price to an identified sum 
of money is known as the layer of the bet. The advantage of this form of wagering to the 
bettor is that, by allowing anyone with access to a betting exchange to offer or lay odds, it 
serves to reduce margins in the odds compared to the best prices on offer with traditional 
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bookmakers.  Exchanges allow clients to act as backers or layers at will, and indeed to back 
and lay the same event at different times during the course of the market.
The major betting exchanges present clients with the three best odds and stakes for 
which other members of the exchange are asking or offering.  For example, for a horse named 
Take The Stand to win the Grand National, the best odds on offer might be 14 to 1 to a 
maximum stake of £80, 13.5 to 1 to a further stake of £100 and 12 to 1 to a further stake of 
£500.  These odds and staking levels may have been offered by one or more other clients who 
believe that the true odds are longer than they have offered.
An alternative option available to potential backers is to enter the odds at which they 
would be willing to place a bet together with the stake they are willing to wager at that odds 
level.  This request (say £50 at 15 to 1) will then be shown on the request side of the 
exchange and may be accommodated by a layer at any time until the event begins.  Every 
runner in the race will similarly have prices offered, prices requested, and explicit bet limits.
The margin between the best odds on offer and the best odds sought tends to narrow 
as the volume of bets increases so that in popular markets the real margin against the backer 
(or layer) tends towards the commission levied on winning bets by the exchange.  This 
commission varies up to 5 per cent, depending on the amount of business the client does with 
the exchange. Clients can monitor price changes, which are frequent, on the Internet website 
pages of the betting exchange, and execute bets, lay bets, or request a price instantly and 
interactively.
Bookmakers have also innovated to take advantage of the Internet, and for many races 
they offer prices competitively, usually for all runners.  Bettors can access the array of prices 
for runners in matrices displayed on sites such as the Racing Post or Oddschecker.  As with 
the exchanges, bettors place bets instantly and interactively. Unlike the betting exchanges, 
however, bet limits are generally not stated, and clients cannot lay or request prices.
In this study we used matched odds data from bookmaker and betting exchange 
markets for 263 UK horse races in order to measure empirically the accuracy of probability 
assessments implicit in the prices simultaneously offered by bookmakers and the leading 
exchange, Betfair.  The bookmaker data are traditional fixed prices1, whereas betting 
exchanges, whose clients are generally non-bookmakers2, offer a parallel set of fixed odds, 
                                                
1 Prices or “odds” are fixed in the sense that once agreed the odds specified in the transaction are 
locked in; the terms of subsequent transactions are subject to market fluctuations.
2 Evidence given by Betfair to a UK Parliamentary committee indicates that only 0.71% of its accounts 
belonged to active customers who made more than £15,000 from trading in the previous year (Joint Committee 
on the Draft Gambling Bill, 2004). Even so, there is anecdotal evidence that bookmakers set up accounts with 
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enabling an assessment of which set of prices has the greatest predictive value. In this way it 
is possible to compare directly the relative evaluative skills of bookmakers and bettors in 
assessing the outcome of races.
Our study was completed in three stages, in which we utilised conditional logistic 
regression, a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) technique. At stage 1 this method was
applied to the datasets in aggregate, with odds probabilities normalised to give a rational 
probability distribution.  Non-runners were removed for the purpose of our analysis. At this 
stage we expected betting exchange prices to be more accurate than bookmaker data as 
predictors of race results because, whereas both bookmaker and betting exchange markets 
hold a structural bias known as the favourite-longshot bias (whereby low probability runners 
or longshots are overbet, and high probability runners are relatively underbet), this 
phenomenon is more extreme in bookmaker markets than in the betting exchanges (Smith et 
al., 2006).
The favourite-longshot bias is a notable empirical finding of many studies analysing 
pari-mutuel betting markets (those in which the odds are strictly proportional to the amounts 
bet on the competing horses; see Snyder 1978 for a major review of the bias in such markets) 
and bookmaker markets (e.g. Dowie 1976; Crafts 1985; Shin 1991; Smith et al., 2005, 2006; 
Paton et al., 2008).  Early studies explained the bias by reference to demand-side factors 
relating to bettor rationality and sophistication; notably, “risk loving” behaviour by bettors 
was cited.
In recent years a number of theoretical and empirical studies of the bias have 
suggested supply-side explanations, stressing the behavioural characteristics of market 
makers (e.g. Shin 1991, 1992, 1993), or structural characteristics of the markets themselves, 
notably Hurley and McDonough (1995), Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997) and Sobel and 
Raines (2003).
Hurley and M Donough present an information based model of the favourite-longshot 
bias. They suggest that odds bias is positively related both to the transaction costs faced by 
bettors as a class in acquiring information concerning the true probabilities of runners and to
the magnitude of the ‘take’ or deductions (i.e. the profit margin or administrative costs of 
market operators). A further implication is that bias is positively related to the proportion of 
turnover attributable to casual or uninformed bettors in the market.  
                                                                                                                                                       
the exchanges to help manage their liabilities.  We took steps to mitigate against the consequent feedback 
between the two odds sets by including stage 3 of our analysis (outlined in the narrative).
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Supporting the Hurley and McDonough hypothesis, Vaughan Williams and Paton 
(1997) find that the favourite-longshot bias is more pronounced in low-grade races than in 
high class races. This finding is consistent with a reasonable assumption that the cost of 
acquiring information relevant to race outcomes is higher for low grade races than high class 
contests because there is likely to be less public and media scrutiny of low grade runners.
Sobel and Raines (2003) offer further supporting evidence for an information-based 
explanation, identifying a lower bias in high volume betting markets, assumed to be better 
informed, than low volume markets, assumed to be proportionately more heavily populated 
by casual bettors, consistent with Hurley and McDonough. Smith et al. (2006) similarly find 
bias to be positively related to market operators’ deductions and/or profit margin, and 
positively related to information search costs.
Shin instead explains the bias observed in bookmaking markets as the consequence of 
bookmakers’ response to asymmetric information where some bettors have privileged 
information concerning the true probability of one or more horses winning a race by virtue of 
their insider status. Shin’s subsequent theoretical model of the bias as an optimal risk 
minimising response of bookmakers to the above situation is developed as the solution to a 
strategic game whereby they set equilibrium prices that maximise profits whilst mitigating 
losses arising from the presence of insiders.
Shin (1993) adapts the theoretical model in order to estimate “Shin’s z”, an empirical
estimate of insider activity in the markets associated with specific samples of races.  He also 
shows that z is a proxy measure for the favourite-longshot bias.  Shin’s estimate of z, the 
proportion of betting turnover attributable to insider trading, is 2.46% for his sample. 
Comparable values have subsequently been found for much larger samples of UK races using 
bookmaker SP data. Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997) and Law and Peel (2002), for 
example, estimate values of 2.03% (481 races) and 2.7% (971 races) respectively.
An independent test of the validity of z as a measure of bias is found in Cain et al.
(2001a), who employ both Shin’s methodology and a separate method initially adopted by 
Crafts (1985) to measure the degree of insider trading in relation to a sample of 1,568 horse 
races and 936 greyhound races. They find the two measures to be significantly associated in
a 2 contingency test, with a significant positive relationship between them subsequently 
confirmed in regression analysis.
Shin argues that the bias evident in bookmaker prices is their response to asymmetric 
information and adverse selection due to the presence of insiders rather than a fundamental 
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inability of bookmakers to evaluate true probabilities.  Bookmaker prices are those that 
maximise profits rather than representing the bookmakers’ estimate of true probabilities. 
Therefore a fairer test of the relative skills of odds makers would be, first, to adjust odds for 
the favourite-longshot bias before making a direct comparison. However, Shin is primarily 
concerned with measuring an aggregate value of z for a sample of races, whereas we are 
interested here in calculating values of Shin’s z for individual races and thereby deriving
adjusted probabilities for each runner in a race. We used a method attributable to Jullien and 
Salanié (1994), later modified by Cain et al. (2001b), to compute individual probabilities 
adjusted for bias. The Jullien and Salanié model specification is described in section 4.
At stage 2 of the analysis we therefore derived Shin probabilities from the nominal 
bookmaker and exchange odds before again applying the MLE model described above in 
relation to stage 1 of our analysis.
Our datasets comprised prices set very early in the market so as to minimise the risks 
of feedback between the two markets.  However we could not eliminate the possibility of 
prices having already converged somewhat through bettors using the two markets as 
benchmarks in arbitrage processes and bookmakers operating within the exchanges to hedge
their liabilities on specific horses.  Given this possibility, at stage 3 the MLE procedure was 
repeated for the subset of horses for which the divergence between bookmaker and exchange 
odds probabilities was greatest. The logic dictating the choice of this class of horses for 
special attention was that, if bookmakers are responsible for offering the exchange odds in 
such cases, the same subjective probabilities should be evident in their own odds. These 
horses are arguably subject to the least feedback between the two markets and permit us 
legitimately to attribute the exchange odds to bettors.
3. Data
To facilitate the study we required two sets of odds for the same races: one set attributable to 
bookmakers and the other to bettors. The first set of prices collected were fixed odds offered 
by bookmakers.  Unlike pari-mutuel prices, once accepted these odds do not vary with 
subsequent fluctuations in the market. The only exceptions are when there are withdrawals of 
runners in the race, in which case a differential reduction is applied based on the probability 
of success of the withdrawn runner or runners implied in the odds.
Bookmakers’ prices were gathered for 700 horse races run in the UK during 2002.  
Sample races were drawn from the 2001-02 National Hunt season, the 2002 Flat season, and 
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the 2002-03 National Hunt season. In order to minimise liquidity issues, sampling was 
restricted to Saturdays and other days where overall betting turnover was likely to be 
vigorous.  One advantage of sampling over the full calendar year is that our data should not
suffer in aggregate from seasonal bias.  Prices were taken from the Internet site of the Racing 
Post, the major daily publication dealing with horse racing and betting in the U.K.  Taking 
prices from the Internet site allowed a direct comparison with betting exchange data to be 
made.
To ensure that bookmaker prices were not merely nominal, a trial was conducted 
whereby bets were placed to establish that the prices stated could be obtained.  Actual bets 
were small (ranging from £5 to £20), but enquiries were also made with individual 
bookmakers as to whether much larger bets would be accepted.  There was evidence of some 
limits to bet size set by bookmakers on occasions, but not frequently enough to raise concerns 
about the integrity of bookmaker prices in general.
We were anxious to avoid including low liquidity races in our final race sample as 
odds are less likely to be representative of informed opinion in such markets. In addition to 
restricting the sample to the most active race days, two further methods were employed for 
excluding low liquidity races. The first involved the use of a set of qualitative decision rules 
for categorising races according to their liquidity initially employed in Smith et al. (2006); 
the decision rules are reproduced in Table 1. Class 1 races are the least liquid, with Class 4 
races having the greatest liquidity. The rules described in Table 1 provided a sound proxy for 
the volume of betting turnover at the time of data collection3. Qualitative descriptors were
necessary as, although trading volumes and bet limits are explicitly stated for all races on the 
Betfair website, they are not normally published by bookmakers; this procedure avoided 
sample bias arising from the exclusive use of exchange data to determine betting volumes.
The bookmaker odds data were matched with corresponding betting exchange prices, 
both acquired at 10.30 a.m. on the morning of the races. This time was chosen as it allowed
sufficient time for markets to achieve acceptable levels of liquidity. However there are 
instances where key runners are withdrawn from a race shortly before 10.30, necessitating 
reformation of the market. When this occurs there is insufficient time for the betting 
exchange markets to regain the liquidity levels commensurate with the Class of race, and 
therefore the decision rules in Table 1 would lead to a classification that did not accurately 
represent trading volume. A second, quantitative rule was therefore applied to mitigate this 
                                                
3 Confirmed by cross-referencing to press reports on betting volume, where available. We also wish to 
thank Lawrence McDonough for constructive advice on the formulation of the decision rules.
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problem in the small number of races affected.  Where bet limits were small, the prices 
offered were ignored, and races where overall betting volume was trivially low were 
excluded from the sample of races on the grounds that the market did not have sufficient 
liquidity to warrant treating such observations as representative.  A minimum acceptable 
aggregate turnover threshold (£2000 per race, by 10.30 am) was applied as a filter to the races 
in the sample in respect of Betfair prices; races where this turnover threshold was not met 
were screened out of the analysis.  After exclusion of races on grounds of low turnover, 267
races remained for analysis, four of which were subsequently abandoned due to adverse 
weather conditions, leaving a final study sample of 263 races.
4. Empirical models employed
Our test of predictive accuracy in relation to the two markets involved conditional logistic 
regression, a maximum likelihood technique giving log likelihood calculations which can be 
judged against the 2 distribution. It is a technique that is frequently employed in empirical 
studies of predictive models in horse race wagering (for good examples, see Figlewski, 1979;
Bolton and Chapman, 1986; and more recently Sung et al., 2005).
For an individual race j with n runners, the conditional logistic regression model can 
be expressed as
pi = 


N
j
Zj
Zi
e
e
1


(2)
where pi is the conditional probability of horse i winning race j; Z is the vector of predictors, 
in this case the subjective probabilities implied by the odds pertaining to horse i (numerator), 
and all race entrants, i = 1….N (denominator); and  is the vector of coefficients attached to 
the predictors.
As a maximum likelihood technique, the estimated coefficients  are those which 
maximise the likelihood function:
L = 

M
k
k
wP
1
(3)
where kwP is the estimated probability associated with the horse winning the k
th race in a 
sample of M races (using the notation employed by Figlewski, 1979).
L is initially calculated with restrictions on the variables Z (i.e. the coefficients are all 
set to zero). In this initial calculation pi = 1/N for all runners in the race, representing the 
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situation where there is no information about the race entrants. After iterative estimation of 
the coefficients, L is re-calculated by dropping the restriction(s) on one or more of the 
predictor variables Z. The interpretation of the change in L is that the closer its value is to 
zero, the more closely are the race outcomes explained by the information held in the 
predictors, in this case the odds.
McFadden (1973) showed that the value 2(Lu – Lr), where Lu is the likelihood 
function calculated with unrestricted predictors and Lr is that with restrictions, closely 
follows the 2 distribution. This test therefore permits us to judge whether a set of odds 
holds significant information about the outcome of races in our sample.
The vector of predictors, Z, in our sample comprises probabilities corresponding to 
the odds in our bookmaker and betting exchange data. Bookmaker prices in the UK are 
expressed as fractional odds values (e.g. 2/1 = 0.33 odds probability; 4/1 = 0.2, and so on). 
The recorded value for each race entrant i was based on the mean of observed bookmakers’ 
odds for that horse expressed as a probability.  The mean of the odds array was chosen rather 
than the outlier on the basis that the former better represents the consensus of bookmaker 
opinion.4 The betting exchange odds adopted were the maximum available to significant bet 
limits. They are expressed on the website as the return inclusive of one unit stake in decimal 
rather than fractional format. Increases in odds at the high probability end of the odds scale 
are expressed in “ticks” of 0.1 point. For low probability runners, prices increase in 1 point 
increments.
At stage 1 of the analysis, we normalised odds probabilities to sum to unity for each 
race in the respective markets, removing withdrawn runners, so that
 oij
o
ijn
ij p
p
p (4)
where nijp is an estimate of the race specific true probability of horse i winning race j.
This method of proportional normalisation, commonly adopted in earlier studies (for 
example, Tuckwell, 1983; Bird and McCrae, 1987), ensures that the odds pertaining to each 
race observe a rational probability distribution, but does not remove the effects of the 
favourite-longshot bias as all odds probabilities are adjusted in the same proportion.
                                                
4
We repeated our three stage analysis using the outlier instead of the mean and found there to be very 
little difference in the outcome.
Page 12 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
11
The initial estimation of the likelihood function (3) involves restricting to zero the 
coefficients of all predictors, from both bookmaker and betting exchange normalised odds 
probabilities. The resulting log likelihood, Lr, represents the model’s best fit with no prior 
information. Further estimations of the likelihood function were then carried out as in Table 
2. The statistic Lm, if significantly lower than the baseline value, would provide strong 
evidence that mean bookmaker prices hold valuable information about the outcome of races.
We expected this to be the case, as bookmaker favourites won 25.48% of the races in the 
sample, representing a large improvement on the expected success rate of a randomly chosen 
runner in each race, 6.84% (263 winners divided by total number of runners in the sampled 
races, 3,843). Similarly, we expected the betting exchange data alone to add valuable 
information, evidenced by Lb.
Lm, L(b,m) shows how the log likelihood for Lm changes by including the exchange 
odds in addition to the existing predictor of bookmaker odds. The estimation Lb, L(b,m)
reverses the order of predictor additions. These two estimations are key to judging the 
relative information held by the two odds sets and, hence, their predictive value.
Shin was primarily concerned with measuring an aggregate value of z for a sample of 
races, whereas for stages 2 and 3 we wished to calculate values of Shin’s z for individual 
races and derive adjusted probabilities for each runner in a race. We used a method 
attributable to Jullien and Salanié (1994) to compute individual probabilities adjusted for 
bias.
Jullien and Salanié restated Shin’s model to show that, for an individual race, the true 
probability of winning pi for horse i can be expressed as
pi = 
)1(2
)1(4
2
2
z
zzz i












 
(5)
where z is Shin’s measure of insider trading for that race, πi is the nominal odds probability 
associated with horse i, and П is the sum of πi in the race. Jullien and Salanié showed that z
can be estimated using the following equation:
1, 




 zp
i
i

. (6)
Through an iterative procedure similar to that employed by Shin, the observed values 
of πi are substituted into equations (5) and (6) to derive race specific values of z that will yield 
probabilities from equation (5), adjusted for insider trading and which sum to unity.
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The idea is that we can derive probabilities for our bookmaker and betting exchange 
datasets using this technique, which should remove the systematic bias in nominal odds 
associated with the strategic behaviour modelled by Shin arising from asymmetric behaviour, 
described in section 1 above. The resulting adjusted probabilities then represent the 
underlying estimates of true probabilities, attributable to bookmakers and exchange clients 
respectively, implicit in the odds.
A question arises as to whether it is legitimate to apply the Shin’s z measure of bias, 
which is derived from a model of bookmaker behaviour, to betting exchange data. Shin 
models bookmaker competition, whereas the exchange consists of individuals who do not 
need to maintain a credible market structure embracing all runners. Aside from the degree of 
bias and level of transaction costs, however, the structure of exchange markets resembles 
those of bookmakers quite closely. For example, for individual runners exchange layers have 
to offer competitive prices to attract bettors with the sum of price probabilities usually 
exceeding unity by only a few percent. On the other hand, the occasions when the sum of 
probabilities falls below one are extremely rare. We felt justified, therefore, in applying the 
Shin’s z measure in this non-bookmaker betting medium.
As the Shin probabilities are estimated independently of results, a useful test of their 
efficiency in removing bias is to calculate returns for the datasets at odds corresponding to 
the Shin probabilities themselves.  If the Shin adjustments are successful, the distribution of 
returns arising from these calculations should be equal across different odds values.  In order 
to test the degree to which our adjustments for bias were efficient, we regressed the notional 
returns to Shin odds equivalents (dependent variable) against odds probabilities 
corresponding to actual odds (independent variable), with standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity, to see if this was the case.  A slope coefficient not significantly different 
from zero would provide evidence that the Shin probabilities were unbiased.  Having derived 
adjusted odds probabilities, we completed stage 2 by repeating the MLE procedures outlined 
for stage 1, substituting the Shin probabilities for the nominal odds probabilities.
For stage 3 of our analysis we required a suitable measure of price divergence.  Cain 
et al. (2001a) compared alternative means of calibrating odds movements during the course 
of market trading; although here we were instead interested in odds differentials arising from 
competing odds values at a point in time, the relative merits of the possible methods of 
measurement are similar.
Arithmetic differences in odds were ruled out due to the disproportionate importance 
attached to the odds differentials of outsiders (a one point odds difference between 9/1 and 
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10/1 does not carry the same significance, in terms of probability or betting turnover, as a 
similar arithmetic difference between 2/1 and 3/1). Crafts (1985) partially overcame this 
problem by adopting the ratio of the forecast odds probability to the final (starting price) odds 
probability. However the trading volume required to change the odds probability from 0.1 to 
0.2 (a Crafts ratio of 2) is much greater than that needed to cause a movement from 0.2 to 0.4 
(also a ratio of 2) and therefore leads to undue emphasis on longshot observations.
Law and Peel (2002) employed the alternative measure, pm, such that
pm = 









 21 1
1
log
1
1
log
pp
(7)
where, for an individual runner in a race, p1 and  p2 are the odds probabilities derived from,
for example, starting odds and forecast odds respectively. Unlike the Crafts ratio, equation 
(7) weights price movements from initially low odds with greater emphasis than those from 
initially high odds, reflecting the greater trading volumes required to cause odds to change at 
low odds. For similar reasons we adopted equation (7) as our measure of divergence, pd, 
between bookmaker mean and exchange odds for each horse, with p1 being the highest odds 
probability value, and p2 the lowest odds probability value. For illustrative purposes Table 3
indicates the divergence for different levels of odds required to yield specific values of pd.
To complete stage 3 we then repeated the MLE procedures employed in the previous 
stages for the subset of horses exhibiting the greatest odds divergence, allowing for possible 
sensitivity of results to our choice of pd value constituting high divergence.
5. Results and discussion
The estimation identifiers used in this section follow the descriptions in Table 2 for the MLE 
iterations based on nominal odds probabilities (stage 1). The corresponding identifiers for the 
stages 2 and 3 iterations based on Shin probabilities differ only in the use of a subscript, a. 
Thus the term “ma” indicates Shin adjusted mean bookmaker odds probabilities; the term 
“ba” similarly indicates Shin adjusted exchange odds probabilities.
Table 4 summarises the stage 1 results of the initial log likelihood estimates for 
normalised odds probabilities derived from bookmaker mean and exchange odds. The 2
test statistics in Table 4 correspond to the various restrictions on predictors outlined in Table 
2.
The log likelihood values for bookmaker odds alone (Lm) and exchange odds alone 
(Lb) indicate that each set of odds individually contributes significant information in 
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predicting the outcomes of the races in our sample; the 2 test statistic for each is significant 
at p = 0.01. Recall that this result was anticipated as each odds set reflects information on the 
respective merits of runners not contained in the baseline model, which assumes a uniform 
probability distribution across race competitors.
The further measures Lm, L(b,m) and Lb, L(b,m) permit us to judge whether either of 
the nominal odds sets holds valuable information in addition to the other set alone. The mean 
bookmaker odds unadjusted for the favourite-longshot bias yield significant additional 
information to that contained in the exchange data, with the 2 statistic associated with Lb, 
L(b,m) being significant at p = 0.05. When the order of addition is reversed, the exchange 
data add significantly to the amount of information concerning race outcomes held in the 
unadjusted mean odds alone, evidenced by a 2 value for Lm, L(b,m) significant at p = 0.01.
Whilst not conclusive, the evidence suggests a marginal superiority of exchange odds as 
predictors. This is consistent with the Shin’s z values for these datasets; z for the bookmaker 
mean odds is 2.17%, significantly greater than that for the exchange odds, at 0.09% (see 
Smith et al., 2006, for confirmation of the independence of these Shin’s z results for the same 
datasets).
We then performed stage 2 of the analysis, repeating the conditional logistic 
regression in relation to odds adjusted for the favourite-longshot bias, which was removed 
using the Jullien and Salanié method outlined above. If the Shin adjustments are successful,
the distribution of returns arising from regressions of returns on odds probabilities should be 
equal across different odds values and should also approximate zero. Table 5 summarises the 
estimated coefficients of these regressions for the unadjusted and adjusted bookmaker mean 
and exchange odds.
The pre-adjustment slope coefficients in Table 5 are consistent with the Shin values 
reported above.  The table shows that before Shin adjustment, the bookmaker odds contain an 
appreciable bias: the slope coefficient  indicates that for every 1% increase in odds 
probabilities, returns increase by a highly significant 1.57%.  After adjustment the coefficient 
estimate reduces to 0.7, insignificant at conventional significance levels.  The  value for the 
exchange odds before the Shin adjustment is 0.52.  This is not significantly different from 
zero, implying little initial bias.  The adjustment of exchange odds decreases the estimate of 
to a value very close to zero and insignificant at any level. We conclude therefore that the 
Shin adjustments successfully remove bias from the data.
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Figures 1 and 2 confirm this outcome, although it is evident that there remains a trend 
in the direction of regular bias in both sets of odds, more pronounced in the bookmaker data, 
if statistically insignificant. Because at stage 3 we used directly the adjusted probabilities 
upon which these regressions were based, we cannot entirely eliminate the possibility that our 
results at that stage partly reflected inefficiencies in the Shin probabilities.
At stage 2 of the analysis, the initial conditional regressions carried out at stage 1
were repeated with the Shin probabilities. The results are summarised in Table 6. From the 
test Lma, L(ba,ma), it is apparent that following adjustment for bias there is highly significant 
evidence that betting exchange odds continue to add further useful  information to that 
contained in the bookmaker odds, with a χ2 value significant at p = 0.01. In contrast, Lba, 
L(ba,ma) yields a corresponding 2 statistic significant only at p = 0.1. For the full sample of 
races with probabilities adjusted for bias, it appears that the betting exchange odds still have 
greater predictive accuracy than the bookmaker equivalents, and the margin of advantage is, 
in fact, greater than for nominal odds.
At stage 3 the conditional logistic regressions were repeated for subsets of horses with 
varying levels of price divergence. In order to avoid an arbitrary choice we performed
regressions for alternative pd filter levels, beginning with pd ≥ 0.01, then pd ≥ 0.02, and pd ≥ 
0.03.
The outcomes of the stage 3 conditional logistic regressions are summarised in Table 
7, organised by pd filter value. For the purpose of comparison the results for the category pd
< 0.01 are also included.  The key values to consider in the current context are those relating 
to the Lma, L(ba,ma) and Lba, L(ba,ma) regressions. By and large, the results in Table 7 
confirm the superior predictive value of the exchange odds found at earlier stages for the 
subset of horses exhibiting greater odds divergence than the norm. Changes in the log 
likelihood values support this conclusion, being significant at p = 0.05 for pd ≥ 0.01 and pd ≥ 
0.03. Our main caveat to this inference is that the result may be partially attributable to the 
inefficient removal of bias by the use of Shin probabilities.
We attribute this greater predictive power to bettor influence, since if bookmakers are 
responsible for offering exchange odds in these cases, why are these probability estimates not 
reflected in their own prices, in which case the divergence would not arise. We also rule out 
pricing error as the cause of high divergence observations as a class because errors would be 
unsystematic, not yielding significant χ2 values. Whether such bettor superiority is the result 
of skill or the possession of inside information is open to question.
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Figure 3 restates the results from all three stages of our analysis in terms of changes in 
log likelihood arising from the key models Lm, L(b,m), our test of exchange odds holding 
additional information to the bookmaker odds, and Lb, L(b,m), the equivalent test for 
bookmaker odds yielding information in addition to the exchange odds.
6. Conclusions
The visual evidence in Figure 3 supports the conclusion, drawn from our χ2 significance tests, 
that the exchange odds tend to have greater predictive value than the bookmaker equivalents 
in our sample. Our expectation that nominal betting exchange odds have more predictive 
value than bookmaker odds due to the lower degree of favourite-longshot bias in the former
is confirmed. After adjusting for bias the exchange odds continue to hold more information 
concerning race outcomes than bookmaker odds, and this result is also broadly confirmed in 
those instances where price divergence is higher than the norm; although the advantage at pd
≥ 0.02 disappears and is only marginal at pd ≥ 0.03, the number of cases in these categories is 
relatively few. In the main, therefore, the exchange odds prove to be superior predictors of 
the results of the sampled races.
Our principal finding contrasts with that of Levitt, who found that bookmakers 
exhibited superior skills in evaluating objective outcomes in the handicapping contest that 
was the medium for his study. The observation was made in the introduction that Levitt’s 
methodology made it likely that the preferences of the most skilled or informed bettors might 
not be revealed if they decided that the terms of the wagers set by bookmakers were 
unfavourable and, in consequence, chose not to trade. The same would be true of the 
bookmaker markets studied here. In contrast the betting exchanges offer opportunities for 
these bettors to trade which are not available in bookmaker markets. For example, skilled 
traders, insiders, and bettors seeking hedging opportunities are all able to lay odds on the 
exchanges which may as a result more accurately reflect the chances of the horses concerned 
than those offered by bookmakers. In these circumstances we might expect the proportion of 
turnover attributable to casual bettors to be lower in the exchanges than in bookmaker 
markets, with a consequent tendency for odds to reflect more closely objective probabilities. 
This account of the differences between the two markets is consistent with recent transaction 
cost explanations of the structure of betting markets, outlined in section 2. It is also 
consistent with the empirical evidence suggesting that decentralised markets are efficient 
predictors.
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Differences in the nature of traders and trading activities may therefore explain the 
greater relative efficiency of the exchanges in reflecting objective outcome probabilities
observed in the current study. Similarly, the results presented here may not so much 
contradict Levitt’s findings as reflect a different composition of traders engaged in the 
respective betting media studied.
As the betting exchanges continue to expand in size and liquidity, it will be interesting 
to monitor how well they continue to predict the outcomes of events for which they offer 
markets.
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Tables
Table 1: Decision Rules for Classifying Horse Race Markets by Liquidity.
Class 1: Races with low betting volume.
Races run at low grade racetracks and for small monetary prizes; often unexposed or 
unknown form for a number of runners; minimal media coverage.
Class 2: Races with moderate betting volume.
Races for middle ability horses; form is more exposed than Class 1 races; average prize 
money.
Class 3: Races with higher than average betting volume.
Competitive races with a high degree of betting interest, generated by characteristics of the 
race or its contenders likely to attract public interest and enhanced media coverage; higher 
than average reported betting volumes in the press.
Class 4: Races with very high betting volume.
High profile and top class races; high profile contending horses; high degree of competition 
and media interest, speculation on runners often extending weeks before the contest.
Note:
The class numbers and definitions here are those employed by the authors, and do not correspond to classes as 
specified by the UK racing authorities.
Table 2: Estimations of the likelihood function with various degrees of restriction for 
race outcome predictors (odds)
Estimation of 
likelihood function
Restrictions on predictors Alternative hypothesis tested
Lr All predictors restricted
Lm Only mean bookmaker odds 
unrestricted
Bookmaker odds hold useful 
information concerning race 
outcomes
Lb Only betting exchange odds 
unrestricted
Exchange odds hold useful 
information concerning race 
outcomes
Lm, L(b,m) Both predictors unrestricted 
(relative to log likelihood of 
bookmaker odds alone)
Exchange odds hold useful 
information additional to that 
contained in bookmaker odds
Lb, L(b,m) Both predictors unrestricted 
(relative to log likelihood of 
exchange odds alone)
Bookmaker odds hold useful 
information additional to that 
contained in exchange odds
Note:
The test statistic in all cases is 2 with 1 degree of freedom
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Table 3: Odds differences corresponding to increasing levels of price divergence, pd
Higher odds Lower odds, yielding specified pd values
pd = 0.01 pd = 0.02 pd = 0.03 pd = 0.04 pd = 0.05
2 1.94 1.89 1.83 1.78 1.73
5 4.72 4.46 4.23 4.02 3.82
10 9.00 8.18 7.49 6.90 6.39
20 16.51 14.04 12.20 10.77 9.63
Notes:
(i)  pd is a measure of the divergence between the odds probabilities equivalent to the mean of bookmaker array 
of odds for an individual horse and the greatest Betfair (betting exchange) odds on offer to non trivial stakes for 
the corresponding horse.
(ii) pd is measured as in equation (7); see also accompanying narrative.
(iii) All odds expressed to a 1 unit stake e.g. “2-1”, “1.94 to 1” and so on.
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Table 4: Conditional logistic regression results for whole dataset:
nominal odds probabilities
Model restrictions - 2 log likelihood
Lr 1368.309
Lm 1247.120***
(121.189)
Lb 1239.801***
(128.508)
Lm, L(b,m) 1235.272***
(11.848)
Lb, L(b,m) 1235.272**
(4.529)
N 3843
Notes:
(i) ***p=0.01, **p=0.05,*p=0.1
(ii) Figures in parentheses are the relevant 2 statistics.
Table 5: Coefficients of returns regressed on odds prob bilities, bookmaker mean & 
exchange odds,  unadjusted & Shin adjusted
Bookmaker mean odds Exchange odds
Coefficients Unadjusted Shin 
adjusted
Unadjusted Shin 
adjusted
c -0.2756***
(0.0581)
0.0037
((0.0898)
-0.0916
(0.0845)
-0.0027
(0.0980)
 -0.3821*** -0.0434  -0.1268 -0.0084
  (0.0873) (0.1421) (0.1327) (0.1568)  
 1.575*** 0.6971 0.5211 0.0843 
(0.5903)    (0.9212) (0.8346)  (0.9850) 
R2 0.0008 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
N 3843
Notes:
(i) *** p = 0.01 ** p = 0.05 * p = 0.1.
(ii) Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.
(iii) c is the coefficient of returns (measured as net profit to a unit stake to the specified odds) regressed on a 
constant.
(iv) Shin adjusted returns are those to notional odds corresponding to Shin probabilities.
(v)  and  are the constant term and slope coefficients respectively of returns regressed on probabilities 
corresponding to the specified odds.
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Table 6: Conditional logistic regression results for whole dataset:
Shin probabilities
Model restrictions - 2 log likelihood
Lr 1368.309
Lma 1246.456***
(121.852)
Lba 1239.962***
(128.347)
Lma, L(ba,ma) 1236.161***
(10.296)
Lba, L(ba,ma) 1236.161*
(3.802)
N 3843
See notes to Table 4.
Table 7: Conditional logistic regression results for subset of horses with
greatest price divergence between mean bookmaker & exchange odds
(based on Shin probabilities)
Model
restrictions pd<0.01 pd ≥ 0.01 pd ≥ 0.02 pd ≥ 0.03
Lr 737.398 302.964 42.296 5.545
Lma 682.924***
(54.474)
263.545***
(39.419)
36.033**
(6.262)
5.493
(0.052)
Lba 681.985***
(55.503)
260.663***
(42.301)
35.642***
(6.653)
5.400
(0.145)
Lma, L(ba,ma) 681.485
(1.438)
259.667**
(3.878)
35.594
(0.440)
1.755**
(3.739)
Lba, L(ba,ma) 681.485
(0.410)
259.667
(0.996)
35.594
(0.490)
1.755*
(3.645)
N 2852 991 207 63
Notes:
(i) This subset includes horses for which ma > ba and those where ba > ma
(ii) See also notes to Table 4.
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Figure 1. Fitted values derived from regression of returns
on bookmaker odds probabilities
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Figure 3. Change in McFadden statistic (-2 log likelihood): Stages 1
(Unadjusted), Stage 2 (Adjusted), & Stage 3 (High divergence)
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Note:
Lm, L(b,m) is the test of exchange odds holding additional information to the bookmaker odds;
Lb, L(b,m) is the equivalent test for bookmaker odds yielding information in addition to the
exchange odds.
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